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As we enter on the fifth century of American history,
we are preparing to show the world, at Chicago, whatever
of the best results of our industry and invention can be put
into visible form. But how little of a nation's achievements can be thus set forth! The currents of thought, the
way of looking at things, the way of putting things, the
drift of opinion, the growth of institutions, that individualize the character of a people, cannot be boxed up and
shipped to Chicago. The Columbian Exposition may tell
the material side of American civilization, but its real life
and spirit must be sought elsewhere, and can perhaps only
be understood in their full depth by those who feel them as
part of their own existence.
The truest gauge of a nation's civilization is its system
of jurisprudence. If there has been built upon our soil an
American jurisprudence, it has been mainly the work of
American lawyers, and its characteristics can nowhere be
better studied or appreciated than in an association like
this.
The name of American may belong, by geographical
right, to every dweller on this continent; but the great
nation of which we are citizens has made it, by right of
history and conquest-conquest, I mean, by predominance
in arts and learning, in literature and commerce-especially
her own. It is, then, to the jurisprudence of the United
States, and of the States of which it is composed, that I
ask your attention.
The great stretch of territory to the north of us is a
dependency of a distant government, and looks for leadership there. Our sister republics to the southward have
been content, for the most part, to follow the lines of the
Roman law. But to us, the spirit of independence that
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came so early to give life and character to forms of governinent and judicial establishments, brought with it a transforming power. Latin civilization had lent color to the
far south and southwest. The Dutch had brought something of it, and more of their own rugged republicanism,
to New York. The Puritans had learned in Holland much
that they afterwards put into the institutions of New
England. But it is not what we owe to Spain, or France,
or Holland, that has made American so different from
English jurisprudence.
The nation that has governed
itself for more than a century, that has within it States
that have governed themselves for more than two centuries,
cannot but have a law and life peculiar to itself, the fruit of
the soil on which they grew.
It has been said that there is a Great Britain and a
greater Britain. But no one land can now be called our
mother country. Time was when Boston and Philadelphia
might well give that name to England, and New Orleans
and St. Louis to France; but in the time that is, when, if
we count by nationalities, there are few cities in Germany
containing more of German birth than do New York or
Cincinnati, and few in Norway with a Norse population
like that of some of our Northwestern towns; when the
best half of Ireland is in America; when the face and
tongue of the Italian and Hungarian have become familiar
on our streets, we may say with CICERO that we have ourselves commenced our line of ancestry. There is to arise
here, HERBERT SPENCER tells us, from the mixture of
allied varieties of the Aryan race, a finer type of man than
has hitherto existed-a type more plastic, more capable of
the modifications needed for the completer social life that is
to come. For this new race we are to prepare the way; and
we and those who went before us have prepared it by the
foundation of a broader and humaner jurisprudence.
Into the law of nations we of America have introduced the principle of voluntary expatriation. It is, indeed," the condition of our existence. The doctrine of
perpetual allegiance was undisputed in the Old World. Its
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application to Americans by the British Crown was one of
the grievances recited in the Declaration of Independence;
but we ourselves asserted its obligation long after independence had been achieved.
JERE.MIAH MASON once said that the development of
an American jurisprudence could only be looked for from
the courts of the National Government. Upon this question, however, it was a court of a State, that of Pennsylvania,1 which, following the language of her constitution,
framed by FRANKLIN, first declared expatriation an original and indefeasible right of man; and this at a time when
those of the United States adhered to the rules of the
common law.' Thus it was left to Congress to affirm by
statute the American principle, as soon as the nation felt
strong enough to assert it against the world,' and treaties
which have been made, in pursuance of this declaration,
have now obtained its recognition in almost every country
that can call itself civilized. This new rule of American
jurisprudence is the work of the Bar, rather than the
Courts. Its earliest supporters were ADAMS and JEFFERSON, and to our attorney generals and the great lawyers
who, from time to time, have had the direction of the
Department of State; we owe especially its international
authority.
For ourselves, also, we have changed the law of
nations as to treaty obligations, in its fundamental conception. Treaties are not for us mere contracts, with no other
sanction than the military power of the other government.
The Constitution of the United States has raised them to
the position of the supreme law of the land, as binding as
an Act of Congress in every American court.
Passing from the relations of States to States, to those
the
State to its own citizens, we find a distinctively
of
American system of criminal procedure. We have viewed
the punishment of crime from a new standpoint, that of
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the reformer. Nine-tenths of those who in England a
hundred years ago, would have been hanged, have been
here instead condemned to labor for a term of years in
what we have named, with kindly hope, a penitentiary.
Pennsylvania was the first of civilized communities to inaugurate this change, under her Constitution of 1776.1
Reformatories for young offenders, also, are distinctively
an American innovation.
It is difficult for men of our day to believe how much
,of "man's inhumanity to man" was shown in the criminal law of England, when the institutions of this country
first took shape. The common law was rigorous enough,
but in the days of the Stuarts and the Georges the number of capital offenses was increased by nearly two hundred. It was not until the beginning of this century that
hanging ceased to be the punishment of a pickpocket. To
arrest a man on a charge of crime was almost equivalent to
a conviction, for he could produce no witnesses in his own
behalf, nor have counsel to plead his cause. It makes
one's blood boil in his veins to read one of the shorthand
reports of the state trials of the seventeenth century; such,
for instance, as that of Stephen College, at Oxford. If a
conviction did not lead to the gibbet, the criminal was
either transported or turned loose on the community after
some mark of bodily degradation, perhaps with his ears
cropped, or a hand struck off, to fix the memory of his
shame upon him as long as life should last. Degrees of
punishment for the greater crimes were marked simply by
the degrees of barbarity with which the wretch was executed. Hanging, was, indeed, a mild penalty, when compared with burning, quartering and disemboweling.'
Not until the great popular movement which found
voice in the Reform Bill, and has made England more of a
democracy than the United States, were these cruelties
12 Poore's Charters and Constitutions, 1547.
2 For a development of the subject of the English Criminal Laws, see
the paper by Hampton L. Carson, Esq., in the June number (1892) of this
periodical.-ED.
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swept away from English law. But in guarding against
their presence here, American jurisprudence may have
gone too far. To forbid the examination of the accused
by torture, or under any form of compulsion, was right;
but was it necessary to forbid the committing magistrate to
ask him anything, except whether he admits or denies the
charge? I believe we have put the State at a disadvantage
in preventing it from calling upon the pris.oner to give an
account of the transaction out of which the charge aroseto tell his own story in his own way, knowing that whatever he says may be used against him on the trial. And is
there a reason which is really good for giving the convict
an appeal to our highest courts on the most trivial points of
law, when the rights of the public are generally determined finally by the trial judge ? It is this over-kindness
to the individual, to the prejudice of the state, which renders possible, and, as many say, defensible, such things as
the killing of the Italians at New Orleans, and the lynchlaw executions that in some of our States outnumber every
year those had pursuant to the sentence of the courts.
In one respect our criminal law is, perhaps, less favorable to the accused than was that of England. We adopted
early the Continental method of prosecutions by public
officers, instead of leaving them to be brought or dropped
according to the dictates of personal feeling, or the desire
for pecuniary reparation.
The strength and value of government by party have
led us to place party conventions under the protection of
the criminal laws. Fraud in balloting at a nominating
caucus is punished in the same way as frauds at public
elections. A new order of rights is recognized: those
which flow from the duty of political organization; for it is
the duty of every citizen to use his elective franchise in
the most effective way. That way, the law feels, is through
party combinations, and therefore our jurisprudence is enlarged to embrace their recognition and protection.
The law of libel, in any government, is one of the
surest tests by which to estimate its hold upon the people.
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The United States was the first to renounce, for its rulers,
the protection of this law. When the decemvirs were
framing the Twelve Tables of Rome, few as were the sub,
jects they thought it important to cover in their code, they
were careful to make libel against the State a capital
offense; for they were the State, and they were turning a
republic into a despotism. When the people of England
were beginning to demand a greater share in her government, it was the law of libel to which the Crown resorted
for its surest weapon of defense, and it was the pride of the
English Bar that, in criminal cases, they nullified it by the
aid of the jury. With us, to the United States, the law of
libel is unknown, because it has no common law, and
.because the only statute ever passed by Congress to replace
it, on this subject, was swept away in the first change of
administration, and, indeed, in no small part was the cause
of that change of administration, while in our States we
have almost everywhere come to the position that, both in
civil and criminal cases, truth is a justification, unless
actual malice is proved.
We have ventured farther than any nation ever dared
to go before in forbidding all ex post facto laws, and this
and other guarantees of individual right we have woven
into our written constitutions, so as to make them the
supreme law, as unalterable as the frame of government
itself
In the same irrevocable way we have severed the relations of Church and State. The famous definition of jurisprudence given by the Roman law, that it is divinarum
alque humanarumretum notitia,justi alque injusliscientia,

has been sharply attacked by modem critics, as confusing
notions of law and religion. But in what nation, before
our own, were law and religion ever separated in their relations to the State? From the first beginnings of patriarchal
society the world has looked at them as coming from a
common source, upheld by a common sanction, and forming
parts of the same administration of government. The
authority of each was deemed necessary to support the
other.
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First of nations, the United States, without the least
reflection on religion of any form, severed the Church from
the State, and freed the current of its jurisprudence from
all ecclesiastical control. Nor has this mutual independence been found incompatible with restraining power in
the civil courts where private rights were affected by unjust
acts of those in ecclesiastical authority. In the organization of the great mother church of Christendom, the bishop
has the power to remove any priest in his diocese from his
parish at his discretion. An American bishop exercised
this power, for what seemed to him sufficient cause, but without notice or hearing. The priest applied to the courts for
redress, and it was held, in granting it, that though it
might be according to the laws of that church to deprive a
man of his livelihood on a charge of failure in duty, unheard, it was not in accordance with the laws of the land.'
The jurisprudence of most countries has been based on
the conception of the rights of the State as against individuals. American jurisprudence rests equally on the
rights of the citizen against the State. We believe that
the State owes an active duty to its people, and that its
welfare is only important as reflecting theirs.
I have spoken of our public prosecutors for wrongs to
individuals. Their appointment is but one illustration of
a principle of American government which demands that
all business, in the well doing of which the public have an
interest, shall be done by or under the inspection of a
public officer, and so that the public may have a full
knowledge of it. This has brought a new security to
landed interests. It makes it possible for any man of
ordinary education to trace a land title, because the material
is at his command, systematically arranged, in a public
record office, not stored in some muniment chest in an old
tower, nor even buried in the files of a notary, whose position is but half official.
Our rules of civil procedure are our own. A few States
may still adhere in name to the cumbrous methods of
IO'Hara
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English origin, but in most we have, and in all shall have,
the simple rules of what, for want of a better name, we call
Code Pleading. Originating in New York, not fifty years
ago it has, in the lifetime of its distinguished author, DAVID
DUDLEY FIELD, not only overspread a large part of our
own country, but supplanted the forms of the common law
in the very land of their birth.
Our attachment to the principle of personal liberty has
modified the law of civil process. Insolvent debtors had
been treated in most countries as a kind of criminals.
America began to open their prison doors, at the area of the
Revolution.'
The law of evidence has been changed in a vital point.
In no country before our own has every man been admitted
as a witness in court. There have been distinctions of
class, exclusions from interest, exclusions for infamy.
American jurisprudence is unwilling to condemn the lowest
or worst of men unheard: it is unwilling to believe that
pecuniary interest necessarily leads men to forswear themselves, or to assume that every party to a suit would
naturally perjure himself to get a verdict. The Roman
law and the rules of English Chancery allowed you to
force an oath upon your adversary, but only at the cost of
making him, so to speak, your own witness. We have
done more wisely, I think, in admitting testimony from all,
on equal terms, leaving it for the triers to give it, in each
case, such weight as it may deserve. The first statute of
this kind in America was enacted in Connecticut, in 1848.
Its author,' soon afterwards went abroad in the diplomatic
service, and, when in England, brought it to the attention
of some men of influence, through whose efforts an Act of
Parliament, of a similar nature. (N & 15 Vict., chap. 99),
was passed in 1851.
We have given a new character to trial by jury. The
right of the jury to judge of the law we have extended to
'See the Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776, art.
Poore's Charters and Constitutions, p. x546.
2Hon. Charles J. McCurdy, LL.D.
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all criminal cases,1 and the Continental plan of giving them
partial control over the sentence, in case of conviction, has
been extensively followed. The authority of the Court has
also been weakened in civil cases, by securing greater
privileges to the Bar in shaping the terms of the charge.
The dangers of these changes in the jury system were
forcibly portrayed, a few years ago, in a paper read before
the American Bar Association by one of your guests on this
occasion, Mr. Justice BROWN. This mode of trial, as it
existed at common law, was well adapted to secure the
rights of the masses against the classes. But it was a
system of exact balances. It demanded a free and fearless
judge as well as a free and fearless jury. The jury may
drag the car of justice, but the judge must drive, or they
will drag it to destruction. The inroads of the bar upon
his prerogatives seem to me a mark of what, even here in a
State that has produced great judges, I venture to term, on
the whole, the degrading effects of the American plan of an
elective judiciary. It indicates a distrust of the independence or the intelligence of the Court. It foreshadows the
gradual extinction of the jury trial in civil causes, because
that can never be permanently satisfactory unless a large
discretion, not to say despotism, is left in the hands of the
thirteenth man.
We have given, I cannot but think, an undue prominence to judicial precedents as a natural source or annunciation of the law. The multiplication of distinct sovereignties
in the same land, each fully officered, and each publishing
in official form the opinions of its courts of last resort,
bewilders the American lawyer in his search for authority.
The guiding principles of our law are few and plain. Their
application to the matter we may have in hand it is the
business of our profession to make, and if we spent more
time in doing it ourselves, and less in endeavoring to find
how other men had done it in other cases, we should, I
believe, be better prepared to inform the Court and serve
our client.

' For a denial of any such

right to the jury, see Comm. v. McManus,
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There have been lawyers bold enough to attack bad
precedents in our highest Courts and to destroy them. You
recollect that conspicuous instance of coming to a right
decision by overturning a wrong one, which is furnished by
the history of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In 1825, a libel in admiralty for seamen's wages,
earned upon a steamer on the Missouri River, was dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, and, on appeal, Mr. Justice STORY
delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, that admiralty furnished no remedies for services that were not rendered on tide-water. There was no better authority for
this than that such had been the rule of the English
Admiralty. But, a quarter of a century later, the same
Court, speaking through a greater, though less learned
judge, and with but one dissenting voice, reversed their
position, and declared that America could not adopt the'
English definition, by which, in the terse phrase of the
Chief Justice, "the description of a public navigable river
was substituted in the place of the thing intended to be
described."
This case of the Genesee Chief' is one of the half
dozen decisions that stand out as the great land marks of
American jurisprudence. I should put first in time that
of Marbury v. Madison, 2 in which Chief Justice MARSHALL
asserted the right of the Courts to declare any statute void
which was in conflict with the Constitution. The second
place I would assign to Fletcher v. Peck, 3 where a private
individual was protected against the revocation of a public
grant. Then comes Dartmouth College v. Woodward,4 in
which Chief Justice MARSHALL read into the words of the
Constitution a meaning which he admitted might never
have been thought of by the. men who framed, or the
people who ratified it. It made the subjection of the
sovereign State to the performance of its obligations, at the
How. 455.
Cranch 137.
S6 Cranch 87.
44 Wheat. 518.
'12
2 1
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command of the civil court, a rule of our jurisprudence.
It brought a new theory of corporate rights into existence.
If they rested on a public contract, that contract the public
must perform. To Milligan's Case 1 we turn when we seek
the limitations of individual liberty in time of war; to
Cummings v. Missouri,2 for its safeguards against ex fpost
facto legislation. The Slaughter House Cases,3 brought
sharply out the distinctions between the citizen of a State
and the citizen of the United States. In Loan Association
v. Topeka,' those limitations on the legislative power,
which are inherent in the nature of a free government, are
stated with telling force, in their bearing on questions of a
public use.
There are other decisions of the Supreme Court which
are as often referred to as these, because they settle hardfought controveries over the meaning of our Constitution
in its political aspects; but those that I have mentioned
seem to me especially noteworthy in their bearing on the
subject we have now before us-the relation of the law to
the individual.
That a woman is an individual, even if she be a wife,
and does not forfeit her personal identity by marriage, is
another of the positions of American law. Our treatment
of the property relations of husband and wife, as it is now
fixed by the statutes of most of our States is almost as far
from the Roman or Continental as from the English rule.
Its principle is not community, but independence. This
separation of property rights is but one of the inroads
made by American law on what had been regarded
throughout Christendom as the natural characteristics of
the marriage relation.
The Church of Rome had declared marriage to be a
sacrament, and indissoluble except by its authority.
The
Protestants of the Reformation denied this, and, under the
14 Wall. 2-124.
'Ibid. 277.
8 16 Wall. 78.
4 20 Wall. 655.
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Puritans, civil marriages and civil divorces were early
American institutions. The gradual extension of the
causes of divorce, and the gradual abbreviation of the trial
of a divorce case in our courts, you are all familiar with.
There have been countries before in which divorce was as
free in law, but none where it has been so free in fact. For
five hundred years the Roman husband could put away his
wife at will, and for five hundred years only one availed
himself of his right, and he was, like NAPOLEON, unwillingly driven to it by the demands of the State.
It seems to me that the number of causes of divorce
recognized in American law might well be substantially
reduced. Indeed, a movement in this direction has been
made, which within the past twenty years has had considerable success. By the last report of the National
Divorce Reform League, it appears that only three States1
now retain the " omnibus" clause in their divorce statutes,
which permits divorces for any cause satisfactory to the
Court. But the evils of our divorce system lie quite as
much in our method of procedure. The recent report on
this subject by the Commissioner of Labor of the United
States shows that a fifth of all American divorces are
granted to parties who were married in some other jurisdiction. We all know how short a residence on the part
of the petitioner is generally made sufficient, and on how
slight a notice to a non-resident respondent, the Court proceeds. Such a notice is always dictated in the first instance
by the petitioner's attorney, and his discretion in the matter is seldom revised, if he keeps within the letter of the
law, however improbable it may be that the other party has
in fact any knowledge of the proceeding.
So far as divorces obtained on default, upon newspaper
publication, against non-residents, are concerned, I suppose
the rule of jurisprudence, here and everywhere, to be that
they are totally void, unless the petitioner was domiciled
within the jurisdiction of the court, or the marriage was
I Washington,
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celebrated there. Just such American divorces have been
disregarded in England and Canada, and a second marriage
The American
by the divorced party treated as bigamy.'
Bar Association, ten years ago, drafted a statute to remedy
this evil, by making domicile, instead of residence the test
of jurisdiction. It has already been adopted in two States
(Minnesota and New Hampshire), and I venture on this
occasion to ask you of the Ohio Bar if your State ought
not, under your advice, to place itself on the same ground.
I have sought to state only such of the leading features
of American jurisprudence as are not found in other systems
or not found under similar conditions. I add one of minor
importance, but interesting, as the natural and spontaneous
growth of the soil. It is the new rule of partnership law,
by which the death of a partner in a mine does not dissolve
the partnership. The rough and dangerous life of the
mining camp demanded the innovation, and obtained it, at
the hand of the courts, without aid from statute.
The drift of American jurisprudence is towards the expression of the law in an orderly and official form; in other
words, towards codification. It has approached the question from the practical side and in a practical way. The
early colonies soon put their scanty statutes into print,
arranged in some convenient way for ready reference, the
various heads often following each other in alphabetical
order, as in our digests of reports. New York led the way
towards a more systematic and comprehensive treatment of
the subject, by her Revised Statutes of 1827, a revision
which, though in many points revolutionary, was so well
considered and well done that it has held the ground for
over half a century, while in most of our States revision
succeeds revision every ten or fifteen years. But there is
nothing distinctively American in codification. It is simply
un-English. It is the natural aim and end of every system
of jurisprudence-of jurisprudence itself, apart from any
particular system of it. Jurisprudence is the science of law,
1Briggs v. Briggs, L. R., 5 Prob. & Div. 163.
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and the orderly statement of its rules can be called by no
better name than Code.
The term I' American jurisprudence" has been taken
in this address as meaning the scientific conception of that
system of law judicially administered within the United
States-not alone the science of American law or the
science of law as applied to America. It is the judicial
administration of law, which, with us especially, gives it a
character and vitality of its own.
It was a true and profound remark of DE TOCQUEVILLE
that the extension of judicial power in the political world
ought to be in the exact ratio of the extension of elective
offices; for if these two institutions do not go hand in hand
the State must fall into anarchy or into subjection.
Our country courts, our justices of the peace, with
combined administrative and judicial functions, our judgemade law, our constitutions, as interpreted and expanded
from the Bench into something far wiser and better than
their builders knew, these, quite as much as our printed
statute books, are the sources and safeguards of our rights
and liberties.
There are few countries where the removal of public
officials is as difficult, often as impossible, as with us.
There is no country where the power of the courts to
direct their action and to punish their misconduct is as
great. Nor is it the executive office only which is thus
amenable to judicial control. The subjection of the Legislature to written rules, enforceable by the courts, is a
feature peculiar to American jurisprudence.
The honor of framing the first written constitution of
government which deserves that name, belongs, I believe, to
the early settlers on the banks of the Connecticut; but it
was not till another century that we find the judiciary recognized as the guardians of constitutions, and, as such,
the superiors of the Legislature.
The occasional and peaceful exercise of the active
sovereignty of the people in direct legislation is an American idea.
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In our constitutional conventions they resume, at long
intervals, for a few weeks' time, their delegated powers, and
re-found the State. Conventions of the people, national
assemblies, are common enough in history, but their work
has been, or come to be, that of revolution. Our sister
republic, France, has not ventured to follow us in trusting
the people with this great power, and in waiting for them
to act, whatever the emergency may be. Her plan is that
if each house of the Legislature deems a revision of the
Constitution necessary, they may meet at once in joint
assembly and effect it by a bare majority.'
This system of American jurisprudence, whose lines I
have tried to trace, is the living voice of the American Bar
-- of the American Bar of many generations. The spoken
word, uttered by a THOMAS LECHFORD, or JAMES OTIS, or
PATRICK HENRY, or JOHN MARSHALL, in other days, may
be forgotten. But, if it stirred men's hearts; if it sank into
men's minds; if it carried conviction; if it was the foundation of verdicts, and judgments, and statutes, the circle of
its influence is widening still.
There are those who tell us that all that is said on
earth, when it dies to the human ear, floats on, upon the
wings of air, to remain forever a witness for or against us
in the life beyond. It may be so; but whether physical
force be or be not eternal and inextinguishable, it is so that
the influence of human thought in the development of
institutions will last as long as the history of civilization.
The science of American jurisprudence is just -beginning to crystallize into form. The new race, whose character it speaks, is still but half developed.
To most of us the days pass all too swiftly in the
common routine of the office and court-room; and as we are
advising our clients or advocating their causes, we hardly
feel that we are doing anything which can outlive the
occasion that calls it forth. But the consultation, the
argument, the opinion, by which the conduct of men, the
I Lois
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disposition of controversies or their prevention, is determined, have an influence wider than we think. These are
the materials from which is being built up, by slow and imperceptible accretion, a new jurisprudence. The philosophy
of the law must be founded on the practice of the law.
Wiser men than we may be the ones to trace out the succession and growth of general ideas, to formulate propositions, to array conclusions in scientific arrangement; but,
after all, what they give is only form. The substance was
our work-the work of the plain average American lawyer.
It is a monument, like the great pyramid, to perpetuate, not
the names of those who made it, but, what is better, their
work , and, better still, it is not to perpetuate all their work,
but only what was best in it.
It has been finely said by one of the first of living
American jurists, Judge OLIVER WENDELL HoLmEs, JR.,
that, "The glory of lawyers, like that of men of science, is
more corporate than individual. Our labor is an endless organic process. The organism whose being is recorded and
protected by the law is the undying body of society." This
work in America began with the first beginnings of its
history, and will continue till it ends. It has had at times
the stamp of individuality. It has called no man master.
It has never copied where it served its purpose better to
originate. It struck out primogeniture because it believed
an equal distribution of property the best foundation of republican government. It forced every deed on record,
without respect to feelings of family pride. It brought
justice within the reach of every man by a system of county
courts and magistracies, under which the judge comes to
meet the parties, instead of forcing them to travel to the
seat of government. It is now perplexing the National
judiciary as they are called on to declare the limits of
public management of private property.
Must a man, whose business has been established
under one law, submit, uncompensated, to its destruction
by another? Can a State demand of its railroads that they
shall reduce their fares or freight-charges so low as to pre-
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elude a dividend upon their stock? Can it require them
to build new stations, or reconstruct their roadbed, with no
regard to their financial ability? Is the police power of a
State susceptible of legal definition-that is, to legal restraint? Such questions are now dividing the Supreme
Court of the United States. They are peculiar to our
system of government. They illustrate its merits and defects. They are but the latest instances of a long series of
great judicial problems which have arisen under our institutions, and which could have arisen nowhere else. For
the first of the series we may look back to the very beginning of colonial records.
We need not be surprised that American jurisprudence
should have taken, so early, a trend and aspect of its own.
The general circulation of ideas, the general diffusion
of knowledge, that was rendered possible by the invention
of printing, was not rendered practicable until books became so plenty as to be cheap, and instead of being published in Latin, were given to the common people in their
own language. This time came to England about three
hundred years ago. The Elizabethan age was a creative
age in literature and philosophy, and the English, who
planted our first colonies came here under the influence of
its inspiration. Their business was to found governments;
their literature was statute law; their gathering-place, if
not the church, was the courtroom or the town meeting.
Such men, thrown upon their own resources, under new
conditions of society, could not fail to make a better law
for themselves than they could find anywhere, whether
in use or in history.
The political and commercial differences between the
English Colonies and England, which showed themselves
as soon as property began to accumulate here, and which
culminated in our independence, kept alive this spirit of
free inquiry into the reason and causes of things.
The repellent influences of the Revolution taught us
to look more to the Continent for our examples. MONTESQUIEU'S Esril des Lois, published about the middle of
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the last century, had a profound effect throughout America.
The same may be said of BECCARIA'S work on Crimes and
Punishments, which appeared twenty years later. Then
came the French alliance, and the French ideas that
JEIFERSON and FRANKLIN brought home from a long residence abroad. And from those days to these, not only
have Americans been familiar with what comparative jurisprudence has to teach, but they themselves have been
growing more and more into a new, composite nationality,
the roots of which strike back into every land whose institutions are in symyathy with the spirit of modern civilization.
Our system of jurisprudence has been built up during
an era of ever-increasing power and prosperity-the glad
youth of a new race. It has served us well so far. Will it
be found equally adapted to those other days that are sure
to come, when a denser population will crowd the land;
when immigration is discouraged or repelled; when there
are no more virgin forests or virgin fields; when, perhaps,
the growing duties of the General Government give it a
still greater weight, relatively to the States? So far as we
can forecast this future, it may, I believe, be our hope and
our confidence that the forces of universal education, and
of universal suffrage, bringing individual responsibility,
will be found equal to the strain.
The American race has built up an American jurisprudence. It knows its value. It will modify it, as new
conditions arise, but it will never surrender its essential
characteristics, its spirit of self-reliance, its principle of
equal, even-handed justice to all.
Nuw HAvzN, CoNN.

